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ABSTRACT
This article explores an aspect of Karl Marx’s concept, praxis. Praxis is 
meaningful work, through which we fulfil ourselves by fulfilling others. 
The discussion draws on the author’s work with postgraduate student 
teachers, where both students and author were researching their own 
practice. Reflecting Marx’s conception of praxis as subjective fulfilment in 
the objective world, this activity was intended to trouble and complicate the 
categories ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, whilst enabling students to become 
both more autonomous and other-oriented. The intention behind this article 
is to develop the theoretical vocabulary of praxis available to educational 
researchers and practitioners. Some ideas from Lacanian psychoanalysis 
are introduced, followed by extensive discussion of Slavoj Žižek’s concepts, 
‘act’ and ‘event’. The key argument is that in a nascent educative praxis, 
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ perspectives can be understood not as fixed points 
of reference, but as dual orientations on a flow of signification. These ideas 
are developed alongside detailed examination of two university-based 
research sessions with student teachers. With reference to session activities, 
a rationale is provided for an emerging educative praxis, in which students 
explore creative tensions between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ perspectives 
on school-based practice.
Introduction
This article explores Karl Marx’s notion of praxis from the perspective of a university tutor, involved with 
the development of secondary school teachers at an English university. Student teachers and their tutor 
were engaging in a process of practitioner research, with the intention of developing a deeper under-
standing of the students’ practice as beginner teachers. The tutor directed students’ attention towards 
the knowledge they took to be ‘theirs’, relative to knowledge they saw as external to themselves. Thus, 
students were encouraged to interrogate connections between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ worlds, to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of how they shape and influence one another.
In theorising this activity, the tutor was grappling with Marx’s conception of praxis. In this conception, 
human life has been artificially separated into ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ domains, whereas, as Marx puts 
it, ‘Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear…as the direct efflux of their material 
behaviour’ (Marx, 1978, p. 154). We think in particular ways because of how we live; thinking will not 
change until we change the way we live (see also 1978, p. 145). One of the key theoretical commitments 
in this article is that educative practice can help bring about such transformation.
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As a worker in the knowledge economy, the market decides how much money or credit I get for my 
work. Yet I am also suggesting that an educator’s work should be regarded as having educative value, 
where the work is valuable in its own right and re-affirming of the life of the worker. In Marx’s terminol-
ogy, educative work regarded as praxis. This is challenging given that student teachers are convention-
ally seen as neoliberal ‘subjects’ in pursuit of accreditation bearing ‘objects’ (Pais, 2013). A caricature of 
teacher education might portray student learning as merely ticking off a list of competencies prior to 
accreditation. The intention with this research was to encourage students to challenge this view of them-
selves. The research employs a rather unconventional methodology, reflecting innovations in the field of 
education that problematise the boundaries between ‘subjectively’ and ‘objectively’ located experience 
(e.g. Adams, Kueh, Newman-Storen, & Ryan, 2015; Caldwell, Osborne, Mewburn, & Nottingham, 2015). 
Two university sessions designed for this purpose are outlined later in this article, illustrating how the 
tutor translated an understanding of praxis into activities supportive of practitioner research.
One of the purposes of this paper is to extend the theoretical vocabulary available to education-
alists working with Marx, the theory of praxis in particular. Given that educative practice involves lan-
guage and thinking and problems with these, I am using psychoanalytic theory to supplement Marx’s 
ideas. Lacan relocated Freud’s unconscious in the workings of language, so that there is a dislocation 
between the linguistic effects we want to make and those actually produced (Lacan, 1977, pp. 23–28). 
For example, when talking with others, I may find myself saying things and conveying meanings I did 
not intend. According to my reading of Lacan, language is neither entirely pliable to the intentions of 
its individual users, nor wholly independent of language users, but persistently on the move between 
the two. To paraphrase Lacan’s explanation in My Teaching, the subject both produces and is produced 
by discourse (Lacan, 2008, p. 36). Building on these ideas, the article utilises Žižek’s concepts act and 
event towards a theorisation of educative praxis. It is argued that educators can work with creative and 
critical engagement in between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective spaces.
In the following sections, praxis means ‘fulfilling work’, ‘subjective’ means seen from the point of 
view of self, ‘objective’ means seen from the viewpoint of the outside, ‘material’ means relating to the 
necessities of life, ‘orientation’ means an unfixed position, act means a radically autonomous action, 
an event is a radically new occurrence, universality relates to all humans, abstraction relates to market 
exchange. ‘Educative’ and ‘educational’ are essentially interchangeable.
Thinking about praxis in education
Recent scholarship concerned with subject pedagogic knowledge, or ‘teacher knowledge’, has devel-
oped a very influential line of inquiry (e.g. Eraut, 1994; Leach & Moon, 1999; Winch, Oancea, & Orchard, 
2015.) Here, the ‘subject’ of the knowledge, the practitioner, is also the ‘object’ of inquiry. The practitioner 
is portrayed as becoming more knowledgeable about ‘their’ practice, by making increasingly astute 
connections between ‘their’ particular needs as a learner and externally located challenges.
However, with teacher education, experience suggests there is limited value in making too clean a 
distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ forms of knowledge. To illustrate this point, I will now 
outline a relatively low-key activity I do with student teachers. The purpose of this example is to illus-
trate how thinking more flexibly about ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ perspectives, can enhance a student’s 
capacity to reflect on their own learning. The course referred to is one-year postgraduate training course 
for secondary teachers of English.
At the beginning of the course after few weeks in university, students begin their teaching practice 
in school. I invite students to make space in lessons to scribble down notes and reflections, particularly 
if the lesson has begun shakily. The immediate purpose is for students to capture what they are thinking 
and feeling at the time. The longer term intention is for students to reflect on this data with the benefit 
of critical distance, to explore how their own ideas, expectations and emotions were shaping up the 
educative encounter. For example, a student might believe that following some focussed discussion in 
class, pupils will inevitably make certain inferences about what they have been discussing. However, the 
student finds that the pupils cannot make this leap. The student’s subsequent reflections on this episode, 
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would help them to discern how their beliefs about certain ‘objective’ properties of knowledge (whereby 
one state of inferential knowledge leads inevitably to another), influenced the situation in ways they 
did not intend and were not ‘subjectively’ aware. The challenge for the student would then be to find 
ways of re-articulating these ‘objective’ properties as aspects of an enriched ‘subjective’ understanding, 
with a view to doing things differently in future. Thus, viewed as fluid, interconnecting orientations on 
learning, ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ perspectives would seem to give valuable explanatory purchase. 
Viewed as fixed vantage points, they have little value in situations such as this.
These issues may seem far removed from Marx’s life and concerns. Yet I wish to argue that Marx’s 
conception of praxis, or fulfilling human work, raises questions of central importance for educators 
and education. In the example above, the student teacher moves between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
perspectives on their practice. Expressed schematically, the question raised by Marx is, ‘on what basis 
can “subjective” and “objective” perspectives be said to belong together?’. That is, what is the common 
terrain, the unifying ground that allows us to switch between perspectives as dual aspects of a single 
reality? Moreover, how can this reality be said to relate to the world of work?
Universality vs. abstraction
Reading Marx encourages two lines of response. With the first, the common ground between the ‘subjec-
tive’ and ‘objective’ is universality, and relates to the material needs common to all humans. The second 
is abstraction, pertaining to the form of equivalence between different kinds of labour, through which 
we participate in the market economy. We can begin to consider these ideas in reference to student 
teachers, by arguing that they may be motivated by two competing sets of beliefs about the ultimate 
purpose of becoming a teacher. With the first, they are driven by a desire for greater knowledge about 
how humans learn, about the benefits of learning for human society, the value of learning compared 
to other kinds of human good. In distinction, with the second set of beliefs, they are concerned with 
acquiring knowledge that can be exchanged for other forms of recognition, such as accreditation 
to become a teacher. Thus, in each case, the translation of ‘subjective’ priorities into inter-subjective, 
‘objective’ reality is imagined to take place very differently.
It seems that student teachers experience universal and abstract perspectives not in a neat dichot-
omy, but a complex and sometimes troubling contradiction. It may be that student teachers juggle 
personal and professional commitments that are not easy to reconcile (e.g. a desire to critique ones 
working environment, set against the need to guarantee accreditation. See Hanley & Brown, 2016a). 
As Judith Butler suggests in her work on universality, tidy conceptualisations are not replicated in lived 
experience (Butler, Laclau, & Žižek, 2000, pp. 28, 29). A student may attempt to move beyond such 
entanglements but giving up old knowledge comes with an element of risk. It is perhaps safer to stick 
with what we have always known, as is revealed in Freud’s concept of the ‘transference-love’, wherein 
‘infantile screen memories return anytime one tries to learn, judge the worth of knowledge, and insist 
one already knows’ (Britzman, 2011, p. 74). In the account of postgraduate university sessions given 
later in this article, student teachers are depicted as grappling with their own propensity to create or 
resist new forms of knowledge in a developmental process of educative praxis. First, further utilising 
concepts in the work of Marx, the notions universality and abstraction are used to frame and develop 
a nascent conception of educative praxis.
Marx, Hegel and praxis
It will be useful to trace some of the ideas being employed, back to their roots in Marx’s texts. As been 
widely noted (Avineri, 1968; Bernstein, 1971; Hill, 2009; Kitching, 1988), Marx’s work was motivated by 
a desire to critique that of Hegel, though Marx saw himself as recalibrating rather than overthrowing 
the Hegelian system. From Hegel, Marx retained the idea that history is essentially dialectical, with the 
twin poles of subject and object comprising inverse sides of a higher reality. Whereas with Hegel the 
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higher reality is geist, or spirit, fulfilling itself in the movement of history, for Marx the higher reality is 
humankind, specifically in their material and productive existence (Marx, 1978, p. 301).
Marx’s writings aimed at exposing how these material necessities locked humans in relations of 
mutual competition and hostility (1978, p. 185). Meanwhile, he developed alternative conceptualis-
ations of the basis on which human beings could be said to belong together. These ideas rested on an 
assumption that all classes of human life were supported by the productive activity of just one group, 
the proletariat, whose participation in human productivity was restricted to alienated labour. Thus, Marx 
developed a conception of non-alienated labour or praxis. In one notable passage, Marx presents a 
vision of fulfilling work, through which the worker objectifies their own creative powers whilst affirming 
and extending social bonds of mutuality.
Suppose we had produced things as human beings: in his production each of us would have twice affirmed himself 
and the other. (1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality and its particularity, and in the course 
of the activity I would have enjoyed an individual life; in viewing the object I would have experienced the individual 
joy of knowing my personality as an objective, sensuously perceptible, and indubitable power. (2) In your satisfaction 
and your use of my product I would have had the direct and conscious satisfaction that my work satisfied a human 
need, that it objectified human nature, and that it created an object appropriate to the need of another human 
being. (3) I would have been the mediator between you and the species and you would have experienced me as a 
redintegration [sic] of your own nature and a necessary part of your self; I would have been affirmed in your thought 
as well as your love. (4) In my individual life I would have directly created your life; in my individual activity I would 
have immediately confirmed and realized my true human and social nature. (Marx, 1967, p. 281)
Experience suggests young teachers enter the profession in search of precisely this kind of work. That is 
to say, teachers often conceive of their interactions with students as more than pedagogically motivated 
exchanges resulting in particular forms of instrumentally useful knowledge. Rather, students teachers 
(and others, of course) are typically concerned with the human ‘material’ underlying institutionally 
sanctioned forms of educative engagement (see Hanley & Brown, 2016a). These points seem especially 
relevant in the exploration of educative praxis, being presented in this article. Perhaps educational 
practice can itself be viewed as a means of mediating between ideas of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ or as Marx 
puts it here, ‘human’ and ‘species’. That is to say, we can view education as part of the basic materiality 
of life, through engaging in which individuals fulfil themselves in relation to one another.
In the above passage, Marx frames this movement from ‘subjective’ to ‘objective’ as a positive tran-
sition from the personal to the universal sphere (see also Marx, 1978, pp. 191, 192). That is, through my 
work I can participate in the material existence of all humans. However, in his great work Capital, Marx 
considers another angle, wherein through a valuation of my labour I am shifted from the domain of 
universality to the realm of abstraction. Here, my work has value in relation to an abstract conception 
of work, or ‘labour in general’ (Marx, 1976, p. 135). Hence, my work appears valuable only in respect 
of similar work of equal value and, as Marx puts it, in explaining his famous thesis on the fetishism of 
commodities, there is a ‘definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, 
the fantastic form of a relation between things’ (1976, p. 165). My labour is transformed into a commod-
ity, an object of exchange rather than innate value. Educational literature abounds with examples of 
professional knowledge subordinated to a common standard (e.g. Gerrard & Farrell, 2014; Locke, 2015). 
For Marx it is through the movement of such abstractions, false substitutes for real (universal) material 
conditions, that workers fall prey to the ideology of dominant groups.
Educative praxis, thinking and criticality
The last section outlined two opposed vocabularies, for conceptualising how the work of a ‘subject’ 
connects with the ‘objective’ world. In the first vocabulary, the individual participates through work in 
the productive existence of the species; in the second, their work is a regarded merely as a commodity 
to be bought and sold. Many educationalists have highlighted the difficulty of knowing for certain 
which category of work ‘education’ falls under (e.g. Hanley, 2015). In a knowledge economy, perhaps 
it is only natural that the value of thinking should be equated with its exchangeable value in the cur-
rency of accreditation or ‘performance’. A conception of praxis relevant for the knowledge economy, 
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would therefore be taking into account how thinking can lay claim to universality, in referring itself to 
the material existence of all humans. Though Marx did not formulate such a universal theory of cogni-
tion (Bernstein, 1971), Leszek Kolakowski developed a Marxian epistemology of the thinking subject, 
where thinking is presented as the process by which the individual marks self as self, as distinct from 
the surrounding world of objects.
Man as a cognitive being is only part of man as a whole … this part is constantly involved in a process of progres-
sive autonomization, nevertheless it cannot be understood otherwise than as a function of a continuing dialogue 
between human needs and their objects. (Kolakowski, 1968, p. 66)
Thus by marking self as self, the thinking subject redefines their relationship with the outside world. 
Kolakowski’s depiction of the inside/outside of thinking is distinct from the Althusserian position in 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, where the human subject is little more than a prop for a 
subjectively located ideological demand (2001, p. 116). The Althusserian denial of human nature has 
drawn criticism from scholars sympathetic to Marxism (e.g. Geras, 1983). Ian Parker (2007) challenges 
Althusser’s use of Lacan’s mirror stage, by pointing out that a self-enclosed human subject cannot 
be available for ideological ‘interpellation’ in the simplistic way Althusser proposes. In contrast with 
Althusser’s moment of total identification or ‘interpellation’, Kolakowski represents human nature as in 
contact with essential objects that resist its advances, requiring the human being to critically re-imagine 
what they really know and who they are.
Newly claimed territory of self may only be mine for the time being, until the outside world (‘material 
actuality’ in Marx’s language), finds a way of claiming it back. Thus, as an educator, I may regard myself 
as ‘someone who knows’, until I meet with some of the harsher classroom realities. Thereafter, I may 
be able to work with a more critically informed conception of who I am and what I really know, and a 
better appreciation of why learners resist educational authorities (see also Freire, 2000). This process 
of updating the image oneself in the face of external resistance is reminiscent of Lacan’s dictum, ‘the 
intervention of the signifier makes the Other emerge as a field’ (Lacan, 2007, p. 15). The ‘Other’ refers 
to the external world of meanings in which ‘I’, the signifier, intervene, thereby defining myself and the 
‘Other’ in relation to one another. Yet the meaning of the signifier is not fixed, it continues to be rede-
fined in its relations with the world in an endless deferral of final meaning.
Often beginner teachers have a limited sense of how pre-existing beliefs and ideas shape their 
pedagogical perspectives. In my work with student teachers, initially they are tasked with ‘noticing’ 
(Mason, 2002) how their activity is motivated without their full awareness. Then students explore where 
these motivations might be coming from (e.g. their own learning histories, backgrounds, attitudes, 
etc.). Reflecting Kolakowski’s theory of cognition, students in my sessions are asked to assert particu-
lar sets of ideas as theirs, whilst continually re-appraising whether ideas are actually theirs or simply 
unexamined mental habits. A simplistic opposition between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ knowledge is 
thereby called into question. Further, they are continually challenged to scrutinise the needs of learners 
(universality), set against the requirements of accreditation (abstraction). Later on I give a fuller account 
of university sessions in which this work was done, for colleagues interested in experimenting with 
similar approaches.
In the next section, the theorisation of educative praxis is further developed. Two accounts of the 
author’s work with student teachers, are presented alongside some Lacanian psychoanalytic theory 
(as interpreted by Slavoj Žižek).
Introducing act and events
This section begins with an extended quotation from Lacan’s My Teaching (2008), wherein Lacan alludes 
to the relationship between a user of language and her presence, or non-presence, within the language 
used. This passage begins with relatively straightforward observations about the grammatical subject of 
a sentence, moving somewhat cryptically onto subjectivity situated outside the sentence, or obscured 
from the grammatical construction altogether:
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There is the subject of the utterance [énoncé]. That subject is quite easy to identify. I means the person who is 
actually speaking at the moment I say I. But the subject is not always the subject of the utterance, because not all 
utterances contain I. Even when there is no I—even when you say, ‘It’s raining’, there is a subject of the enunciation 
[énunciation], and there is a subject even when it can no longer be grasped in a sentence.
All this allows us to represent a lot of things. The subject that concerns us here, the subject not insofar as it produces 
discourse but insofar as it is produced [fait], cornered even [fait comme un rat], by discourse, is the subject of the 
enunciation. (p. 36)
In the shorter paragraph Lacan seems to be implying that customarily, subjectivity is located behind 
intentional acts of speaking or writing, i.e. acts of creation or authorship. But this approach is only 
partial or superficial (‘not insofar as it produces discourse’). Lacan seems to be saying that subjec-
tivity is itself produced in a prior gesture of expression or articulation (énoncé/énunciation). Thus, it 
seems the idea one has of oneself as a user of discourse, at least some of time, depends upon a more 
fundamental conception of discursive intentionality. As Lacan suggests in this passage, we might be 
surprised, even feel ‘cornered’, when certain discursive intentions are identified as ‘ours’. For example, 
I find it interesting to observe seminar discussions, particularly where students are involved in debate 
or disputation. Sometimes a student says something to which another student takes exception. The first 
student might find that their initial point gets lost in the ensuing exchanges, with the second student 
responding to an image or impression of what they think the first student intended to say, rather than 
what was meant. The first student may feel ‘cornered’, trapped by an image of what they supposedly 
think. The disputed image may seem to gather its own (‘objective’) momentum that, from their limited 
‘subjective’ position, the first student may struggle to counteract.
Bearing in mind Marx’s conception of praxis as work in which we fulfil ourselves through fulfilling 
others, such seminar debates have interesting implications for a notion of educative praxis, being 
developed in this article. Such debates reveal that our utterances do not in any straightforward way, 
convey the intentions we may have for them. They are re-shaped and re-directed by the intentions of 
others, and in responding to these changes we may begin to adjust the image we have of ourselves, to 
re-appraise who we think we are. In the Lacanian perspective being presented here, identity is not fixed 
but subject to endless re-iterations, as we update ideas about ourselves from a position that itself is not 
permanently fixed. As Lacan puts it in another famous dictum, ‘the signifier is that which represents the 
subject for another signifier’ (2008, p. 36). In the above debate, the second student is not responding 
to the first student as such, but to a place-holder in discourse, a ‘signifier’ or image of the first student’s 
meaning, influenced by their own (the second student’s) desires and intentions. My general point here 
picks up, again, on the Marxian theory of cognition developed by Kolakowski, above. Our work as edu-
cators requires us to define our thinking as clearly as possible in language. To assert certain thinking as 
ours. And yet, with that very gesture of assertion (‘enunciation’), we open ourselves to the workings of 
discourse, where our thinking is continually answerable to the needs of others.
Working with a notion of educative praxis might therefore encourage us to see thinking as an inter-
play of both ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ perspectives. This interplay is now theorised, influenced by Žižek’s 
conceptions of acts and events, though as the students were English graduates, an alternative approach 
could have been to emphasise the psychoanalytic dimension of reading and responding to literature 
(Alcorn & Bracher, 1985). Such an approach might emphasise individual responses to occupancy of 
different discursive positions in the activity of reading, thinking or talking (Bracher, Alcorn, Corthell, 
& Messardier-Kennedy, 1994). In the perspective being adopted here, the notion of an act highlights 
the perspective of the subject, working purposively on an externally configured world. Meanwhile, the 
notion event emphasises the perspective of the outside or ‘objective’ world, influencing the ‘internal’ 
world of the subject or learner.
The two university sessions described next, were run for postgraduate student teachers of sec-
ondary English. The course included a practitioner research dimension, in which students were per-
sistently revising a developmental story about learning to be a teacher. The particular circumstances 
of the project, including student and tutor data, are outlined elsewhere (Hanley & Brown, 2016a, 
2016b). Throughout the one-year course, students gathered data capturing various dimensions of 
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their school-based practice (a reflection after a lesson, a newspaper snippet, reflections on student 
interactions, a recollected conversation with a mentor, etc.). These formed the basis of subsequent 
analytical work at university.
University session one: The ‘subjective’ perspective
In a university session, students formed small groups and shared short extracts of data (i.e. capturing 
different aspects of their school-based activity). Students were asked to retain the original form of 
words when sharing data, and not to offer paraphrase, elucidatory comment, or any further addition 
to the original wording. When responding to the others’ data, students first wrote down their thoughts 
without discussion taking place. Students then read out their responses, again without dialogue taking 
place. These activities had previously been trialled by the tutors, who noted the effects of group psy-
chological processes (Bibby, 2011), whereby students became overly concerned with the reactions of 
peers and lost sight of the original data. Students were asked to pay close attention to how the group 
dynamic shaped the subsequent discussion, for example, by generating consensus around particular 
interpretations of the data and downplaying others. The purpose of this activity was to encourage 
students to recognise in themselves the desire to participate in socially sanctioned responses to the 
complexities of practice. In a Freudian register, students were nudged towards perceiving the workings 
of transference, by recognising how the desire for love and knowledge acts as defence against what 
is new and unproven (Britzman, 2011, p. 71). We intended to relieve the data (as far as possible) from 
the dragging effects of peer-group interaction and let it assert itself ‘objectively’, in ways that might 
unsettle or reconfigure current modes of understanding.
In theorising the nature of such liberated use of language, Žižek notes
A truly autonomous symbolic act or intervention never occurs as the result of strategic calculation, as I go through 
all possible reasons and then choose the most appropriate course of action. An act is autonomous not when it 
applies a pre-existing norm but when it creates a norm in the very act of applying it. Take the act of falling in love: 
I don’t fall in love when I meet a woman who meets my pre-established criteria; if it’s true love, then I don’t love 
the woman for her smile, eyes, legs, etc.—I love her smile, eyes, etc. because they are hers. So it is not that I act and 
make choices without reasons, rather that I freely choose which set of reasons will determine me. (Žižek, 2014, p. 21)
In the session outlined here, students were being encouraged to see themselves as capable of such 
autonomous acts. It was important for students to try to let the data speak for itself, to feel challenged 
into coming up with an innovative response. Equally significant was for students to notice the routines 
of thinking with which they were tackling the data, and to try to analyse these stock responses. The 
intention was for students to become more self-determining in the way that they were dealing with the 
data and each other, whilst being alert to an image or idea of the data being presented by others, and 
to allow for these responses in their own thinking. Thus, the students were aiming to become ‘beings 
for themselves’ as well as for others (Freire, 2000, p. 74). As is suggested by Žižek in this passage, for the 
activity to be significant, there was a sense in which students had first to decide to treat it as significant, 
rather than waiting for the significance to appear. As Žižek says in a related passage, there is always 
something undecidable, a ‘moment of contingency’ in every manifestation of meaning (Žižek, 2014, 
p. 21). That is, for a passage of meaning to be taken as meaningful, requires a simultaneous assertion that 
the passage is meaningful, with the assertion (or ‘enunciation’) itself acting as guarantor. The assertion 
can be understood as the locus of an act, in the Lacanian sense under consideration. Through discursive 
acts, we assert or announce new ground where alternative meanings can take shape.
This essentially formal conception of acts is open to criticism for not taking into account the real 
conditions in which acts take place. As human agents we are dependent on our judgement of when 
to act and liable for the consequences. With student teachers it may sound simplistic to present a 
conception of acts as assertions of new discursive space, when such assertions may sit uncomfortably 
alongside the need to fulfil course criteria and gain accreditation. Žižek’s work has drawn criticism for 
perhaps over-valuing invariant structures in the social and psychological fields and neglecting their lived 
phenomena (Butler et al., 2000, p. 29). Nevertheless, gains in autonomy in student teachers can expose 
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fault lines between alternative understandings of the purposes of teaching. As has been suggested 
above, educative praxis aiming at self-fulfilment through meeting the needs of learners (universality) 
may sit at odds with meeting the demands of accreditation (abstraction). Through participating in 
activities like the one outlined here, students may be enabled to recognise how such difficulties create 
tensions in their own thinking, and to generate a stronger sense of themselves as autonomous learners 
able to tackle these issues.
Introducing events
‘Repression’ is a central concept in Freud’s work (Freud, 1986, pp. 519–533). During psychoanalytic 
treatment, the analysand constructs psychic defences against the admission of certain repressed truths. 
However, it is just such signs of truth, betrayed through their defensive psychic structures, for which 
the analyst looks to direct the treatment. Žižek notes
Resistance … is itself contaminated by what it tries to repress, so its analysis in working through is not just a 
process of dismantling the obstacles in order to gain access to truth—here also, la verite surgit de la meprise, truth 
is immanent to the process of covering up … something that can be uncovered by the immanent analysis of 
resistance. (Žižek, 2014, p. 76)
In a strange paradox, it is precisely the effort to lead the analyst away from the truth that reveals the truth 
where it is. In a parallel from the world of education, the true emotional state of a teacher is revealed 
when they are most trying to conceal it—i.e., in front of a difficult class. Above all, the teacher wants to 
conceal the effort of concealment. Daniel Cho suggests that facing up to this repressed element involves 
the creation of ‘disturbing’ knowledge, or, knowledge that we already have but do not want to own up 
to (2007). ‘Disturbing’ knowledge therefore seems to come at us from outside ourselves—that is, from 
outside the common-sense view of ourselves we may be trying to defend. This combination of acute 
otherness, and intimate proximity to our innermost selves, characterises Žižek’s conception of the event.
Žižek’s conception echoes Deleuze’s account of events, contained in The Logic of Sense. For example 
in Žižek’s (2014, pp. 99, 100) discussion of signification in the work of Levi Strauss, mirrors a discussion 
in Deleuze’s earlier work, with Žižek’s point of ‘suture’ (2014, pp. 99, 100) between signifier and signi-
fied fulfilling a similar function to Deleuze’s ‘principle of the emission of singularities’ (Deleuze, 1990, 
pp. 58–61). Žižek’s event contrasts with the now famous conception of Alain Badiou, whereby an event 
comprises an external structure, ‘something that happens in situations as something that they and the 
usual way of behaving in them cannot be accounted for’ (Badiou, 2001, p. 41). In contrast, in Žižek’s 
psychoanalytic perspective, events arise in what we take to be immanent conditions of lived situations, 
where the situation already contains ‘disturbing’ knowledge in need of further scrutiny.
University session two: The ‘objective’ perspective
Students were invited to explore how their professional development was being influenced by expec-
tations of ‘common sense’ in different (school and university) locations. The stimulus material was an 
excerpt from Christopher Nolan’s movie Memento. The protagonist in that movie has acute memory 
loss, so faces a constant battle to re-orientate himself to shifting surroundings. In opting for this movie, 
tutors felt that students were likely to feel a resonance with their own, rapidly changing professional 
circumstances. Like the central character, Leonard, the students were amassing evidence (notes, reflec-
tions, records of meetings, lesson observations) that captured aspects of current experience at particular 
moments, highlighting aspects of continuity, or disjuncture with subsequent events. Despite these 
precautions, Leonard is continually troubled by the knowledge that he does not have. He concentrates 
on trying to muster a ‘common sense’ response to the shifting hazards being laid before him.
Students were asked to gather different kinds of data relating to the same occurrence in school, for 
example, their own reflections on an episode of their teaching, set against feedback from a tutor or 
mentor. The thinking behind making these comparisons was to draw students’ attention to alternative 
versions of ‘common sense’ implicit in the data. Like Leonard in Memento, students needed to find 
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ways of working with ‘common sense’ whilst questioning where it might be leading them in terms of 
future understanding. For example, a tutor’s comments might seem unnecessarily incisive or harsh, 
whilst drawing attention to technical aspects of classroom delivery hitherto overlooked. Conversely, 
a student may be troubled by having to be seen to ‘perform’ in class, and dealing with these emotions 
might lead them to think more deeply and critically about ‘performance culture’ in future. Of course, 
none of these developments is straightforward. Reflecting Žižek’s conception of the event, students 
were being asked to look more carefully at ideas about practice in which they were already involved, 
perhaps without full acknowledgement or awareness. They were invited to notice where such insights 
were troubling or created pressure, and to consider why this might be. Implicit in this work was the 
assumption that the ‘external’ or ‘objective’ world would continue to come back at them and surprise 
them. Calling to mind Kolakowski’s theory of cognition once again, students were being encouraged 
to look at their own thinking from the ‘objective’ perspective, from the point-of-view of the world 
pushing back at their conception of themselves as autonomous learners. In tangling with these various 
pressures, it was hoped that students would be willing to continually renew their ideas about what the 
external (material, actual) world was really demanding from them. That is, they would remain sensitive 
to the (universal) needs of learners whilst recognising that their understanding of these needs would 
continue to change. In responding to these changing needs, students were also refining a sense of 
their own capacity to act—to invest in a renewed conception of themselves as autonomous learners.
Conclusion
This article explored some of the theoretical implications of the author’s work with postgraduate stu-
dent teachers. It was suggested this work can be viewed as a nascent educative praxis, in Marx’s sense 
of achieving self-fulfilment through fulfilling the needs of others. However, the categories ‘subject’ and 
‘object’, ‘self and ‘other’ are problematic, particularly in an ‘other’- oriented field like education, where we 
work so closely alongside other people. These ideas were explored in detailed reference to university- 
based activities, intended to encourage students to become more autonomous and other-oriented 
practitioner-researchers. A theorisation was developed, drawing on Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, 
particularly Žižek’s concepts act and event. It was suggested that ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are not fixed 
categories but alternative orientations in a continuum of meaning. An emergent educative praxis (or 
‘thinking’, in the shorthand of this article), would therefore involve remaining open and responsive to 
the interlay of perspectives. In particular, an educative praxis would be exploring its obligation to the 
requirements of universality—presented here as the real needs of learners.
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